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EXPLAINING THE GENDER POVERTY GAP IN DEVELOPED AND TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES I. INTRODUCTION
As economies throughout the world experience large and wrenching changes, poverty has increasingly become a problem in country after country. This is true regardless of whether these changes result from globalization, the economic transition from socialism to capitalism, increasing marketization and privatization, or some other major economic transformation (Aslanbeigui, Pressman & Summerfield 1994; Funk & Mueller 1993; Moghadam 1996) .
A concomitant, disturbing aspect of rising poverty throughout the world is that poverty has increasingly become feminized--women are much more likely than men to be poor.
This phenomenon was first noticed in the US (Pearce 1978 (Pearce , 1989 Pressman 1988) , but more recently the problem of the feminization of poverty has become an international concern as well (Pressman 1998; Casper, McLanahan & Garfinkel 1994) .
This article employs the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) to
compare poverty rates for female-headed households (FHHs) with poverty rates for other households in a number of developed and transitional economies. It then seeks to explain why, in some countries, female-headed households are so much more likely to be poor compared to other families.
The next two sections describe the LIS and discuss some of the problems encountered in measuring poverty. The paper then computes poverty rates in individual countries for 2 female-headed households and for all other households using the LIS database. Given the problems associated with measuring poverty, we present several estimates of poverty for both types of household. Two sections then look at two theoretical explanations for the gender poverty gap--human capital theory and a Keynesian approach that emphasizes the importance of fiscal policy as an antipoverty tool. The last section summarizes the main findings and draws some policy conclusions.
II. THE LUXEMBOURG INCOME STUDY
The Luxembourg Income Study began in April 1983 when the government of Luxembourg agreed to develop, and make available to social scientists, an international microdata set containing a large number of income and socio-demographic variables.
One goal in creating this database was to employ common definitions and concepts so that variables are measured according to uniform standards across countries. As a result, researchers can be confident that the cross-national data they are looking at and analyzing has been made as comparable as possible. This wealth of information permits researchers to do cross-national studies of poverty and income distribution, and to address empirically questions about the causes of poverty.
It also allows great flexibility in how income and poverty 4 are measured.
III. POVERTY CALCULATIONS USING THE LIS
How to calculate poverty rates has been a matter of considerable controversy in the US since the 1960s. The method currently employed was developed by Mollie Orshansky (1965 , 1969 it may no longer be valid given sharp increases in the earned income tax credit during the 1990s.
The most frequent criticism of the Orshansky methodology, however, is a philosophical one rather than a technical one.
Orshansky developed an absolute measure of poverty. Poverty is supposed to measure the minimum income necessary for a family to survive during the course of a year. But several authors (Dunlop 1965 , Fuchs 1965 , Rainwater 1974 , Ruggles 1990 Consequently, some way has to be found to convert one income into an equivalent income denominated in some other currency.
Exchange rates between two currencies is a first, logical suggestion. But exchange rates vary considerably from day to day, from month to month, and from year to year; and they vary for speculative reasons that have nothing to do with changes in the relative value of the two currencies or the relative living standards in the two countries.
One attempt to get around this problem is to look at purchasing power parity. The idea behind this notion is straight-forward. Some goods are sold virtually everywhere 
IV. ESTIMATING THE GENDER POVERTY GAP
Following the standard LIS methodology for computing poverty, Table 1 A number of studies of the poverty gap (e.g., Casper, McLanahan & Garfinkel 1994; Christopher et al. 1999 ) have looked at the ratio of poverty rates for female-headed households and other households rather than differences in these two rates. This approach may result from the habits of labor economists, who typically examine and study earnings ratios. But looking at poverty rate ratios is objectionable on two counts. First, poverty rates are supposed to represent the probability that a family is poor. When comparing the poverty rate for female-headed households with the poverty rate for other households we usually want to know how much more likely it is that female-headed household will be poor.
Differences in poverty rates give us this important information; ratios do not.
Second, with ratios, small percentage point differences can lead to large ratio differences that can be misleading when we attempt to interpret the numbers or analyze the causes of the gender poverty gap. For example, if 1% of other households are calculated to be poor and 2% of female-headed households are poor (essentially the results for the Czech Republic), ratios focus on the fact that women are twice as likely to be poor as men. But given the reporting errors in survey data, plus the somewhat arbitrary nature of any equivalence scales and poverty lines, the difference between a poverty rate of 1% and a poverty rate of 2% is quite small and may not be robust or significant. Differences in poverty rates makes this fact clear; poverty rate ratios do not. To the contrary, with ratios, a poverty rate for female-headed households of 20% and a poverty rate for other households of 10% (essentially the case of Canada) seem just as bad as the 2% and 1% case because it also yields a ratio of 2. But clearly, women in the Czech Republic are relatively better off than the women in Canada. To make this clear it is necessary to focus on poverty rate differences rather than on ratios of poverty rates.
The gender poverty gaps reported in Table 1 Studies using other waves of the LIS, and examining female-headed households and poverty (Wright 1995; Pressman 1998) These Waves show only small gender poverty gaps. When Waves IV and V datasets finally come online we will be able to see the impact of the full transition process. Other evidence of the impact of this transformation on women (Funk & Mueller 1993; Aslanbeigui, Pressman & Summerfield 1994) prevents one from being optimistic about gender poverty gaps for these nations as the transition process moves forward.
V. A SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Given the problems with survey data, as well the problems with defining poverty that we discussed in section III, one important question that needs to be addressed is how much hinges on the decisions that get made when measuring poverty.
This section attempts to answer this question by means of a sensitivity analysis. our results is that a number of countries with moderate gender poverty gaps when we set a higher poverty line now have negligible poverty gaps. In the UK, for example, the gender poverty gap falls from 6.3% to 0.1%, while in Israel the gender poverty gap falls from 4.8% to 0.9%. Overall, the correlation between the gender poverty gap using a poverty line set at 50% of median (adjusted) income and the gender poverty gap using a poverty line set at 40% of median (adjusted) income exceeds 80 percent. Table 1 by using a different equivalence scale to get adjusted household incomes. Table 3 gives every person in a given household an equal weight, thereby assuming that no economies of scale exist for household consumption. We can think of this as the other extreme to the normal assumption of fairly significant economies of scale in family size. Table 1 and the gender poverty gap on this alternative definition of adjusted household income is 70 percent.
VI. POSSIBLE CAUSES OF THE GENDER POVERTY GAP
Theoretical explanations for different gender poverty gaps among nations can generally be divided into three broad categories.
First, neoclassical economic theory attributes wage differentials primarily to productivity differences. Someone who is more valuable to their firm will get paid more than someone who contributes less to firm revenues. Human capital theory (Becker 1993) has taken this idea one step further, and has attempted to explain wage rates based upon the education and experience level of the individual. The insight of human capital theory is that more educated workers will be more productive and will thus receive higher pay. Likewise, more experienced workers will be more productive, and should also be paid more money than less experienced workers.
This theory can be applied to gender differences in where women receive lower pay than men, even when they do the same work and provide the same benefits to the firm. Another take on the discrimination angle is the claim that occupational sex segregation has put women into a set of jobs with low pay (Bergmann 1974 , Sawhill 1976 , Strober & Arnold 1987 or a set of industries (the service sector) that pay poorly (Northrop 1990) . Obviously, the greater the discrimination against women in the marketplace, the lower the earnings of women relative to men and the higher the gender poverty gap will be.
Finally, government fiscal policies can affect the gender poverty gap in two main ways. Within a particular country, spending programs, or social transfer payments, can be geared more towards husband-wife households or more towards femaleheaded households. The more that social programs give to female-headed households relative to other households, the lower the gender poverty gap should be. Meager social insurance for female-headed families in the US has been cited (Rodgers 2000 , Zopf 1989 ) as a major cause of high poverty rates for female-headed households. This factor also may contribute to different national gender poverty gaps.
In addition to spending money, governments also collect taxes. Poverty calculations are usually made using after-tax, rather than before-tax, incomes. If government tax policy in one country favors married-couple households over single taxpaying units, female-headed households will do relatively worse after-taxes than other households, and we should see a greater gender poverty gap.
VII. TESTING ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OF THE GENDER POVERTY GAP
This section examines two of the three theories discussed above. We first explore how human capital considerations affect the gender poverty gap. Then we look at the impact of fiscal policy on the gender poverty gap. Given the usual time and space constraints, tests of the feminist approach, which look to discrimination as the cause of the gender poverty gap, will be left for future research. Table 5 .
Column 3 of Table 5 shows the poverty rates for FHHs under the assumption that they had the same educational distribution as other household heads. Column 4 of Table 5 then shows the increase in poverty for FHHs that is due to the lower educational attainment of the household head. The Keynesian argument is that income distribution in general, and poverty rates in specific, depend on fiscal policy decisions made by the government. On the Keynesian view, the bigger the government safety net, and the broader and deeper (or more generous) the net, the lower the national poverty rate (see Pressman 1991) . Because FHHs are more likely to be poor without any government assistance, the more generous the level of government transfer payments, lower the gender poverty gap.
Tables 6, 7 and 8 allow us to examine this theory. Table   22 6 assumes no government benefits and that no taxes are imposed on earned incomes. It also assumes that there are no private transfers among households, such as child support or alimony payments. As a result, factor income (wages, interest, dividends, rent, etc.) is taken to be total household income.
Calculating poverty analogous to our method in Table 1 --not receiving at least 50% of median (adjusted) household factor income--gives us enormously high poverty rates. This is especially so for FHHs, where poverty rates typically exceed 50% and reach as high as 70%. This, no doubt, stems from the fact that FHHs usually have only a single adult earner. When women head up families with children, they may have child rearing responsibilities that limit the number of hours they can work each day and each week, and therefore the sorts of jobs they could hold. Moreover, women typically earn less than men, and so they suffer a further disadvantage. The result is that FHHs have low factor incomes and high poverty rates compared to other households.
The gender poverty gap in Table 6 is rather striking; it averages (unweighted) more than 30% when fiscal policy and private transfers are excluded. This contrasts with an average poverty gap of 4.4% when taking the impact of government spending and taxes as well as private transfers into account (Table 1) . Also striking is the fact that when we look at just factor incomes, the US gender poverty gap lies a bit below the (unweighted) average gender poverty gap for 23 all countries in Table 6 . Likewise, the poverty rate of FHHs in the US is below the (unweighted) average for all LIS countries in Wave III. What is true of the US is also true of Canada and Russia, two of the other four countries with very high gender poverty gaps. Looking at only factor incomes, both have below average poverty rates for FHHs and below average gender poverty gaps. Canada, in fact, has the second lowest gender poverty gap and the third lowest poverty rte for
FHHs when looking at just factor income. Australia, our last poorly performing country, has a below average poverty rate for FHHs, but a gender poverty gap that is slightly above average.
Overall, Table 6 makes it quite clear that measured in terms of income received from economic activity, women do rather badly in one country after the next. Ignoring all private transfers and fiscal policy, in nearly every country FHHs would stand a greater than 50% chance of being poor.
They would also be 32% more likely to be poor than other households in virtually all countries. Table 7 adds two important private transfers to factor income--child support and alimony payments. Poverty rates in each country are again computed based on whether adjusted household income falls below 50% of median adjusted household income. The main result of Table 7 is that private transfers seem to make very little difference. Adding these payments to household income reduces poverty rates for FHHs a little and reduces the gender poverty gap a bit (each goes down by half a percentage point), but in both cases these rates remain very high. Table 8 looks at gross income before taxes. Here we include all government benefits in family income figures as well as all private transfers. Poverty rates again are calculated as the fraction of families whose gross income (adjusted for family size) falls below 50% of median (adjusted) gross income. As before, the poverty gap is the difference between the poverty rate for FHHs and the poverty rate for other households.
The first striking thing about Table 8 is the sharp drop in poverty due to various government transfer payments.
Government expenditures reduce the poverty rate of FHHs by around two-thirds and also reduce the poverty rate of other households by around two-thirds.
These declines, it is important to note, are not the result of just adding more types of income (and therefore more income) to each household. Poverty rates are computed based on a poverty line that is 50% of (adjusted) gross income; since gross income exceeds factor income for each family, median income rises for every family and the poverty line rises as well. In fact, if gross income rose proportionately to factor income for every household, there would be no change in poverty rates at all. So the sharp decline in poverty that we see in Table 8 must be due to the equalizing effect of the 25 added government expenditures.
The second thing to notice about the last column of Table   8 Moving from the last column of Table 8 back to Table 1 
